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Abstract
We study the impact of learning-by-doing with spillovers in competitive markets
with free market entry. Within a two period model, we consider ﬁrst the case where
ﬁxed costs are incurred only once, and entry is once and for all. In the second case
ﬁxed costs are incurred in each period, and both market exit after the ﬁrst period
and late entry in the second period is possible. For the ﬁrst case ﬁrst best allocations
can only be decentralized by subsidizing output in the ﬁrst period and additionally
paying an entry premium. If exit and late entry are possible and if market exit by
some ﬁrms is socially optimal, the optimal policy scheme requires a nonlinear output
subsidy which serves to discriminate between exiting and staying ﬁrms. We further
investigate the comparative statics eﬀects of the diﬀerent policy instruments.
JEL classiﬁcation: H23, L11
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Learning-by-doing has been identiﬁed as an important strategic device in the theo-
ries of both industrial organization and international trade. The bulk of literature
has investigated the strategic eﬀects of learning-by-doing, and several researchers
have identiﬁed market failure through learning. In the political debate it is often
argued that there might be too little learning, and hence production of innova-
tive industries should be subsidized in order to spur learning. Therefore, Petrakis,
Rasmusen and Roy (1997) have asked the most natural question whether learning
induces market failure in competitive markets with free entry. For the case of merely
private learning, their answer is a clear ”no”. Put diﬀerently, they show that there
is no need for a regulator to intervene in the market since ﬁrms fully internalize the
eﬀects of learning today on their cost structure tomorrow, and hence are willing to
cope with negative proﬁts in the infant stage of production, anticipating positive
proﬁts in the mature stage.
In this paper we extend the work of Petrakis et al. by assuming that in addi-
tion to private learning there are also positive learning spillovers among the ﬁrms.
This assumption is supported by empirical evidence from several industries (see e.g.
Argote and Epple (1990), Isoard and Soria (2001), Lieberman (1984), and Lloyd
(1979)). If we refer to pure private learning we mean that cost reductions in the
mature stage of production depend only on each ﬁrm’s own level of output in the
early stage, while with learning spillovers ﬁrms also beneﬁt from other ﬁrms’ pre-
vious volumes of production. If ﬁrms enjoy learning spillovers, it is not surprising
that they will not engage in suﬃcient learning compared to the social optimum.
What, however, comes out as a surprise is that the regulator is not able to reach a
ﬁrst best allocation by simply subsidizing output. In order to characterize optimal
policy schemes we study two diﬀerent cases. In the ﬁrst case, ﬁxed costs are incurred
only once and entry is once and for all. In the second case ﬁxed costs occur in each
period and both early exit and late entry in the market are possible. We ﬁnd that
if entry is once and for all, the regulator needs two separate instruments in order
to implement both the socially eﬃcient levels of learning and market entry under
3decentralized, competitive decision making, a subsidy per unit of output in the ﬁrst
stage and a premium on entry (a lump sum subsidy). If in the second case with
ﬁxed costs in each period it is socially optimal that some ﬁrms leave the market, the
regulator needs to employ a non-linear subsidy scheme on output in the ﬁrst period
in order to discriminate between staying and exiting ﬁrms.
We also investigate the comparative statics eﬀects of those instruments. If entry
is once and for all, we show that raising the entry premium unambiguously leads to
an increase of the equilibrium number of ﬁrms, and to a decrease in ﬁrm output in
the ﬁrst period. By contrast, the eﬀects of increasing the output subsidy are less
clear: the number of ﬁrms still rises under certain conditions, but the eﬀect on ﬁrms
output is ambiguous for both periods. If ﬁx costs occur in each period, we get more
crisp results. If either the entry premium or the output subsidy is raised, prices
cannot increase and total output cannot decrease.
As mentioned above most researchers who were interested in learning eﬀects have
emphasized the strategic aspects and, therefore, have studied either oligopoly models
or imperfect competition with endogenous market structure. Arrow (1962) was the
ﬁrst to emphasize that learning-by-doing may cause spillovers and hence can be a
public good. Bardhan (1971) was the ﬁrst to ask whether or not the existence of
learning spillovers may cause market failure. Within a trade model he shows that
in the presence of learning a subsidy on output unilaterally improves welfare of the
home country. Rauch (1992) extends this model and oﬀers a rule of thumb for policy
makers for the optimal subsidy. A second branch of literature focuses on learning-
by-doing eﬀects in models of imperfect competition. Fudenberg and Tirole (1983)
study the implications of (mainly) private learning-by-doing for market conduct.
Under the assumption of constant instantaneous marginal costs they show that
no price taking equilibrium exists and, henceforth, they study an oligopoly model
where learning is a strategic variable. For this case they predict excessive learning.
Hence, in their model, the regulator can improve welfare by taxing output in the
ﬁrst period and subsidizing it in the second one. Dasgupta and Stiglitz (1988) draw
attention to the point that Fudenberg and Tirole (and also Spence (1981)) assume
identical ﬁrms and exogenous market structure. They argue that if learning is at
4least partly private and one ﬁrm has an initial cost of any size, this advantage
will increase and the industry will experience growing concentration. Cabral and
Riordan (1994) adopt the assumption of diﬀerent ﬁrms. They show that in a price-
setting, diﬀerentiated duopoly with only private learning and constant instantaneous
marginal costs an initial market dominance of one ﬁrm can be increasingly self-
enforcing. They also show that learning can lead to an equilibrium where ﬁrms
are worse oﬀ with learning than without learning, i.e. proﬁts are lower, although
learning is socially desirable. In other words, learning increases competition too
much from the ﬁrm’s perspective. Leahy and Neary (1999) combine the issues of
imperfect competition and trade by examining optimal (trade) policy if ﬁrms engage
in Cournot competition on international markets and the domestic ﬁrm incurs cost
cuts in the second period through learning-by-doing in the ﬁrst one. They show that,
if intertemporal pre-commitments are possible, the optimal subsidy is increasing in
the rate of learning but is decreasing if pre-commitment is not possible.
Miravate (2003) studies the optimal time-consistent tariﬀ which the regulator
should set when a national, learning monopolist competes with a cost eﬃcient for-
eign ﬁrm that produces a substitute to the monopolists’ good. Under certain as-
sumptions he concludes that the tariﬀ and the domestic price will decline with the
rate of learning. Jin, Perote-Pena and Troege (2004) take a diﬀerent approach by
considering Bertrand competition in diﬀerentiated products and non-strategic learn-
ing, i.e. ﬁrms do not take into account the cost reduction in future periods caused
through production in the present. They argue that ﬁrms act boundedly rational
either because the learning process is too complex to be subject of optimization, or
because managers want to maximize proﬁts in the short run. Under these assump-
tions they show that there might be a social loss due to high market concentration.
To minimize this loss the regulator should enhance the spillovers, for example by
encouraging information ﬂow among ﬁrms.
Our paper is organized as follows. In section 2 we ﬁrst set up the basic model
in 2.1. In subsection 2.2, we characterize socially optimal allocations for the case
where ﬁxed costs are incurred only once, and in subsection 2.3, we study the optimal
policy of the regulator. We investigate the comparative statics eﬀects with respect to
5changes in the subsidy levels in subsection 2.4, where we also present some examples.
In section 3, we investigate the case where ﬁxed costs are incurred in each period,
and market exit and late entry is possible. We present the extension of the model
in subsection 3.1, characterize the optimal policies in subsection 3.2, look at the
comparative statics eﬀects in subsection 3.3 and present examples in subsection
3.2.4. Some concluding remarks follow in section 4.
2 Entry Once and for All
2.1 The Basic Model
We consider a closed economy with a competitive industry and free entry. Firms
incur learning eﬀects by both their own level of output in the early phase of pro-
duction (private learning), but also through the level of output by the other ﬁrms
(learning spillovers). In order to model this we have to consider at least two periods
t = 1;2. We denote by n the number of ﬁrms and by yt the output of a typical (sym-
metric) ﬁrm in period t. Total output in period t is written as Yt = nyt. Further we
denote by C1(y1) and C2(y2;L) the variable production cost in period 1 (without
experience) and period 2, respectively, where L = y1+²(n¡1)˜ y1 represents the total
level of learning, and (n ¡ 1)˜ y1 is the output of the remaining (n ¡ 1) ﬁrms.1 The
extent of learning spillovers is reﬂected by the parameter ² with 0 · ² · 1, where
² = 0 represents the case of pure private learning and ² = 1 the case of complete
spillovers. In the latter case, it does not matter for the cost reduction whether some
output is produced in the own ﬁrm or by some other ﬁrm.
We assume that the cost functions Ct satisfy the following properties: Ct
yt > 0
and Ct
ytyt > 0; i.e. we have positive and increasing marginal costs in each period.
Moreover, C2
L < 0 and C2
y2L < 0; which means that learning through production (by
1Note that n ¸ 1. Allowing also for ﬁrm numbers 0 ¸ n ¸ 1 as it is often done - see the
examples in Petrakis et al. (1997)- does not make sense here, because learning spillover eﬀects
would be negative.
6the own or by the other ﬁrms) in period 1 decreases both cost and marginal cost
in period 2. Furthermore, C2
LL > 0; stating that the marginal eﬀect of learning is
decreasing. For technical reasons, in particular second order conditions, we assume
overall convexity of C2, implying C2
LLC2
y2y2 ¡ [C2
Ly2]2 > 0 for y2;L > 0. Finally, we
assume C2(y2;0) = C1(y1), i.e. in the absence of learning the cost functions are
identical in both periods. Since we allow for free entry, we assume that there is also
a ﬁxed cost F which in this section the ﬁrms incur only once as an entry cost as is
also the case in the model of Fudenberg and Tirole (1983). In section 3 we also study
the case where ﬁrms incur a ﬁxed cost in both periods. A ﬁxed cost incurred in only
one period implies that the ﬁrms will either produce or stay out in both periods.
The reason is that with strictly convex costs the ﬁrst few units in the second period
are produced almost for free but sold at a positive price. Therefore, competitive
ﬁrms will always want to produce in the second period until the marginal costs are
equal to the price.
Demand for the industry’s output is given by an inverse demand function pt =
Pt(Yt) which, as usual, is downward sloping, i.e. P
0
t(Yt) < 0. Since ﬁrms are sym-
metric and incur increasing marginal costs, an optimal allocation must also be sym-




P1(Y )dY ¡ nC
1(y1) ¡ nF + ±[
Z ny2
0
P2(Y )dY ¡ nC
2(y2;L)] (1)
where ± is the social and private discount factor.2
2.2 The Social Optimum
The social planner maximizes welfare with respect to y1;y2 and the optimal number
of ﬁrms n. The ﬁrst-order conditions are given by the following equations, where
2In general, the social and the private discount factor need not coincide. We abstract from
those diﬀerences since they are not important for the focus of this paper.
7Wy1 denotes the partial derivative @W
@y1 and so on:




L(y2;L)[1 + ²(n ¡ 1)]] = 0 (2)
Wy2 = P2(Y2) ¡ C
2
y2(y2;L) = 0 (3)





L(y2;L)²y1] = 0 (4)
The ﬁrst condition states that a typical ﬁrm’s marginal cost in the ﬁrst period
should be equal to the consumers’ marginal willingness to pay for the good plus
the social marginal beneﬁt incurred by a cost cut in the second period. The second
equation is the usual text book condition stating that the marginal willingness to pay
equals marginal costs. Finally, condition (4) determines (together with conditions
(2) and (3)) the optimal number of ﬁrms. Interestingly, this condition also contains a
learning eﬀect. This is so because the marginal ﬁrm which enters the market imposes
a positive externality on the other ﬁrms by creating a new source of learning.
2.3 The Optimal Policy in a Competitive Industry
In the decentralized setting we assume that ﬁrms are small and behave as price tak-
ers. They maximize their intertemporal proﬁt taking into account only the marginal
learning eﬀect of their own production but not the positive externality which their
production imposes on the other ﬁrms. As we will see below, a laissez-faire envi-
ronment does not lead to a ﬁrst best allocation. The existing literature remains -
as far as we know - silent about optimal subsidy regimes which account for learning
spillovers in competitive industries with free entry. Anticipating the optimal policy,
we allow the regulator to pay both a per unit subsidy on output sout and a premium
on market entry sent. Given these instruments a typical ﬁrm’s proﬁt can be written
as
[p1 + sout]y1 ¡ C
1(y1) ¡ F + sent + ±[p2y2 ¡ C
2(y2;L)]
The ﬁrst order conditions of a price taking ﬁrm are then given by




L(y2;L)] = 0 (5)
¼y2 = p2 ¡ C
2
y2(y2;L) = 0 (6)
8In addition, free entry leads to the following zero-proﬁt condition:
¼ = [p1 + sout]y1 ¡ C
1(y1) ¡ F + sent + ±[p2y2 ¡ C
2(y2;L)] = 0 (7)
Equating (2) - (4) with (5) - (7) reveals that the optimal subsidy on output must



















2, L¤, n¤ are the eﬃcient output levels, amount of learning, and the
number of ﬁrms, respectively.
The intuitive explanation of why besides the output subsidy the entry premium is
necessary to reach a ﬁrst best allocation is as follows. While the output subsidy sout
accounts for the fact that there is too little output of each ﬁrm in the ﬁrst period, we
need the entry premium sent to take into account that there is also too little market
entry. This is maybe best explained at hand of the following example. Assume that
only two ﬁrms are active without an entry premium but three ﬁrms operate with
the optimal entry premium sent. The two active ﬁrms get a per unit subsidy for the
spillovers they cause on each other. If the third ﬁrm enters, it receives a subsidy for
the spillovers it renders to the other two ﬁrms. But in its proﬁt function the third
ﬁrm does not account for the eﬀect that the spillovers of the ﬁrst two ﬁrms are now
spilled over to itself and are thus of more value. This increase in value is exactly




We can summarize our ﬁndings in the following result:
Proposition 1 In a competitive economy with free entry and both private learning-
by-doing eﬀects and learning spillovers, a per unit subsidy sout = ¡±²(n¤¡1)C2
L(y¤
2;L¤)
on ﬁrst period output and an entry premium sent = ¡±²C2
L(y¤
2;L¤)y¤
1 for each active
ﬁrm lead to the ﬁrst best allocation.
9From this it follows immediately that a laissez-faire policy induces market failure.
In order to make sense of the subsidy policy, we assume that market equilibrium
is unique and stable. The stability conditions are given in the appendix.
2.4 Comparative Statics
To study the eﬀects of a change in both the output subsidy and the entry premium
we totally diﬀerentiate (5) - (7) and solve for dy1=sent; dy2=sent and dn=sent keeping
sout constant, and vice versa. We look also for the comparative static eﬀects on total
output Y1 and Y2. Some eﬀects follow directly from our assumptions. Other eﬀects
require additional assumptions on the cost functions. For this purpose consider the















y2Ly1 ¸ 0 (12)
The eﬀects on an increase of the entry premium can now be summarized by the
following result:
Proposition 2 Let our assumptions on cost and demand hold, and assume that the
competitive equilibrium with market entry is stable.
i) Then @n=@sent > 0 and @y1=@sent < 0.
ii) If (10) holds, then @y2=@sent < 0.
iii) If (11) holds, then @Y1=@sent > 0:
iv) If (12) holds, then @Y2=@sent > 0.
The proof is given in the appendix. The intuition is as follows: an entry subsidy or
premium has the same eﬀect as a decrease of ﬁxed costs and thus lowers the (min-
imum) average cost. In the standard textbook static model of partial equilibrium
10with free entry this results in more entry and less output per ﬁrm. The same eﬀect
can be observed here with respect to both the number of ﬁrms and output per ﬁrm
in the ﬁrst period. The eﬀect on second period output per ﬁrm is ambiguous in
general, but output decreases if condition (10) holds. The reason for this ambiguity
is that after the ﬁrst period has passed, the number of ﬁrms can be considered as
ﬁxed since no further entry is possible by assumption. With learning and spillovers,
more output in the ﬁrst period lowers the second period variable cost. In the stan-
dard partial equilibrium model with a ﬁxed number of ﬁrms, however, lower costs
raise the single ﬁrm’s level of output. Hence in our model two oﬀsetting eﬀects oc-
cur where under condition (10) the output contraction eﬀect through market entry
dominates the output expansion eﬀect through lower costs.
The eﬀect on increased total output is intuitive and consistent with the results
of the textbook model without both learning and spillovers. Although we need
additional conditions such as (11) and (12) to prove the eﬀect, we did not ﬁnd
counterexamples where the entry premium causes total output to fall in at least one
of the two periods.
Let us next consider the comparative statics eﬀects of an increasing output sub-
sidy. To derive unambiguous eﬀects, we need to impose, however, some further











y2Ly2 ¸ 0 (14)
Note that conditions (11) - (14) all have in common that the cut in both cost and
marginal cost through learning is not too large. We obtain the following results:
Proposition 3 i) If condition (12) holds and ² is suﬃciently small, then
@y1=@sout > 0.
ii) If the conditions (10) and (14) hold, then @y2=@sout < 0.
iii) If condition (14) holds, then @n=@sout > 0.
11iv) If the conditions (12) and (13) hold, @Y1=@sout > 0 and @Y2=@sout > 0.
The proof is given in the appendix. We call the eﬀects stated in the proposition
the normal eﬀects. Thus, as one would expect, a subsidy on ﬁrst period output
increases the individual ﬁrm’s output in the same period. It seems to be surprising,
however, that normally a ﬁrm’s second period output decreases. The intuition is
that the subsidy makes it comparatively more attractive for the ﬁrm to produce in
the ﬁrst period. Since market entry eliminates all proﬁts the ﬁrm shifts production
from the second to the ﬁrst period. This is true although the costs of the second
period decrease with a higher level of learning. If, however, some of the conditions,
stated above, are violated, it can happen that raising a subsidy causes output to
decrease in the ﬁrst period and to increase in the second period, as example 1 shows.





± = 0:0001, ² = 1 and F = 10. Increasing the output subsidy from sout = 0:2 to
sout = 1, causes y1 to fall from 1.22463 to 1.22458 and y2 to increase from 3.956 to
5.215.
Note that in the example the conditions (10) and (14) are both violated. Condi-
tion (12) holds, but ² is not small enough to cause @y1=@sout > 0.
Due to the increase of the output subsidy the number of ﬁrms can decrease if
condition (14) is violated as is shown in example 2.
Example 2 Let Π = p1y1¡6:5y2
1¡10+±[p2y2¡0:5(3y2¡0:1L)2¡2y2
2]+souty1 with
± = 1, ² = 0:9. We ﬁrst set sout = 0 and then sout = 1. Further let Pt = 100 ¡ Yt.
Then we get the results of table 1.
3The reader might notice that the cost functions chosen in this and the following examples do
not satisfy CyyCLL ¡ C2
yL > 0 as assumed in the theoretical part but yield CyyCLL ¡ C2
yL = 0,
i.e. only the necessary but not the suﬃcient condition for overall convexity holds. However, we
could easily get overall convexity by adding some ´y2 with ´ ! 0 to the cost function without
changing the trend of the results of the examples. We did not, because the computation time for
the examples almost exploded.
12Table 1: The number of ﬁrms can decrease.
sout = 0 sout = 1
1. Period 2. Period 1.Period 2.Period
y 1.49 1.82 1.51 1.83
n 53.87 53.87 53.75 53.75
Y 80.42 98.09 81.18 98.21
The number of ﬁrms decreases from 53.87 to 53.75, while individual and total output
increases in both periods. Two oﬀsetting eﬀects inﬂuence the number of ﬁrms. On
the one hand, the output subsidy leads to increasing total output produced by more
ﬁrms. On the other hand, increasing total output induces more learning and lower
costs in the second period implying the possibility that the market can sustain less
ﬁrms in the second period. Here, the second eﬀect dominates.
3 Fix Costs in Both Periods - Early Exit and Late
Entry
In the preceding section we have assumed that ﬁxed costs occur only once, i.e. they
are sunk after the ﬁrst period. Petrakis et al. (1997), by contrast, allow for ﬁxed
costs in both periods and also for learning in ﬁxed costs. They show that with
pure private learning under certain conditions market exit is possible which means
that there are some ﬁrms which produce only in the ﬁrst period. In this section we
also assume that ﬁrms incur ﬁxed costs in both periods and thus we allow for both
market exit and late entry.
3.1 Extension of the Model
For simplicity we assume that ﬁxed costs are not aﬀected by learning and are denoted
by F1 and F2 with F1 = F2 = F. In this case three types of ﬁrms are possible: Firms
13which exit early after the ﬁrst period (X-ﬁrms), ﬁrms which stay and produce in
both periods (S-ﬁrms), and ﬁnally ﬁrms which enter lately and produce only in the
second period (E-ﬁrms). For this analysis we denote by ns;nx, and ne the number
of S-ﬁrms, X-ﬁrms, and E-ﬁrms, respectively. Further, we denote by ys
1 and ys
2 the
output of the S-ﬁrms in period 1 and 2, respectively, by yx the output of the X-
ﬁrms in the ﬁrst period, and by ye the output of the E-ﬁrms in the second period.
Assuming symmetry of staying, exiting and lately entering ﬁrms, we can write Y1 =
nsys
1 + nxyx as total output in the ﬁrst period and Y2 = nsys
2 + neye as total output
















2(ye;Le) ¡ (ns + ne)F]
Two things are important to emphasize. First, in line with the results of Petrakis
et al. (1997), it is easy to see that, if ² < 1; i.e. if there is some private learning, it
can never be optimal that some ﬁrms leave the market while at the same time new
ﬁrms enter the market in order to produce in the second period. The argument is
that, given such an allocation, we could simply improve welfare by substituting ﬁrms
entering lately by exiting ﬁrms because the potentially exiting ﬁrms have learned
already and hence, by staying, would incur lower costs in the second period compared
to those ﬁrms entering lately. Secondly, for cases where some ﬁrms enter lately, the
learning parameter L is diﬀerent for staying and for entering ﬁrms, denoted by
Ls = ys
1 + ²[(ns ¡ 1)ys
1]; and Le = ²(nsys
1); respectively. We can summarize the ﬁrst
observation in the following proposition.4
Proposition 4 Assume that spillovers are incomplete, i.e. ² < 1; ﬁrms incur ﬁxed
costs in both periods and both exit and late entry are possible.
Then it is socially optimal that either some ﬁrms leave the market after the ﬁrst
period and no new ﬁrms enter, or no ﬁrm leaves the market, and some (or no) ﬁrms
4This proposition is similar to Baumol’s et al. (1982) result for multiproduct ﬁrms.
14enter lately. It can never be optimal that some ﬁrms leave the market and at the
same time some new ﬁrms enter the market.
3.2 Optimal Policies if Late Entry or Early Exit Occurs
Petrakis et al.(1997) show that with convex costs late entry is never optimal, but
that early exit can be optimal. In the presence of learning spillovers, however, both
early exit and late entry are possible under both regimes, laissez-faire and in the
social optimum. This we will demonstrate in the examples 3 and 4 below.
3.2.1 Late Entry
If late entry is optimal, the stocks of learning incurred by the staying and lately
entering ﬁrms, Ls and Le respectively, are diﬀerent. This does not cause a problem
though, and the ﬁrst best allocation can be achieved by the same instruments as
in the case where there is entry only once and for all. This result can be stated as
follows:
Proposition 5 If late entry of some ﬁrms is optimal, then the regulator can achieve
the ﬁrst best allocation by oﬀering an output subsidy and an entry premium according






























e are the eﬃcient output levels of the ﬁrst and the second period,
L¤
s and L¤
e the optimal amounts of learning capital of staying and late entering ﬁrms,
respectively, and n¤
s and n¤
e the optimal number of ﬁrms.
For the proof see the appendix.
The following example 3 shows that it can indeed be optimal that some ﬁrms
enter lately.
15Example 3 [Late entry in the social optimum]
Let ² = 0:9, ± = 1, F = 10, Pt = (100 ¡ Yt)=9, C1(y1) = 2y2
1, C2;i(y2;i;Li) =
(y2
2;i ¡ ®Li)2 + y2
2;i with i = e;s, and ® = 1=15. Then we will observe late entry in
the social optimum with the results given in table 2. E-ﬁrms produce less than the
Table 2: Late entry in the social optimum, ² = 0:9, ± = 1
S-ﬁrms E-ﬁrms
y n y n p Y
1. Period 2.24 14.05 0 0 7.62 31.42
2. Period 2.61 14.05 2.60 1.36 6.64 40.22
S-ﬁrms in the second period, the market price decreases and total output increases.
3.2.2 Early Exit
If, by contrast, it is socially optimal that some ﬁrms cease production after the ﬁrst
period, matters are more tricky. In this case the size of the externality created by
staying ﬁrms and by exiting ﬁrms is diﬀerent. The reason is that the staying ﬁrms
internalize their marginal private learning eﬀect of size ±C2
L(ys
2;Ls) and impose a
positive externality on the other (ns ¡1) ﬁrms of size ±²(ns ¡1)C2
L(ys
2;Ls), whereas
the exiting ﬁrms create a positive externality of size ±²nsC2
L(ys
2;Ls) for the staying
ﬁrms. Hence, a regulator cannot achieve the ﬁrst best allocation by paying both a
uniform subsidy and a uniform entry premium because the ﬁrms decisions are not
identical ex-post. We ﬁrst describe the optimal policy given that the regulator can
actually discriminate between ﬁrms before we drop this assumption and characterize
the optimal subsidy scheme if discrimination is not possible.
If we assume that the regulator can ex ante disriminate between the ﬁrms or -
if this is possible - pays the entry premium and the output subsidies after the ﬁrst
period, i.e. after exit has occured, we can establish the following result.5 Here, we
denote by ys¤
1 ; y¤
x the socially optimal output levels in the ﬁrst period of the staying
5A problem with this kind of policy may be that the ﬁrst period in the model may last several
16and the exiting ﬁrms, respectively. Accordingly, we denote by ys¤
2 the optimal level






x) the optimal level of learning.
Proposition 6 [Optimal policy with discrimination in the case of early exit]
If exit of some ﬁrms is optimal and the regulator is able to discriminate between
staying and exiting ﬁrms, he can achieve the ﬁrst best allocation by paying an output
subsidy sx
out to those ﬁrms which plan to leave the market after ther ﬁrst period, and
both an output subsidy ss
out and an entry premium ss
ent to the staying ﬁrms according






























For the proof see the appendix.
Discrimination like this may not be legally feasible though. If we drop this
assumption, the regulator can still implement the ﬁrst best allocation by using













s) if ﬁrms choose the optimal
levels ys¤
1 and y¤
x, respectively. Since these are the only requirements on Sout(y);
this subsidy function is not uniquely determined. To achieve the optimal number of
ﬁrms, the regulator has to pay either an entry premium or to charge an entry fee.
These premia or fees may be diﬀerent for staying and exiting ﬁrms. This may cause a
problem if the regulator cannot ex ante diﬀerentiate or discriminate between exiting
and staying ﬁrms. Hence, it is necessary to construct a mechanism consisting of a
subsidy function and entry premia/fees in such a way that the staying ﬁrms receive
higher premia (or pay lower entry fees) than exiting ﬁrms. In this case the premia
years in real time. Therefore, the commitment of the regulator to pay subsidies after exit has
occured might not be credible because policies can change with a new and even with the same
government. That said, for short real time periods this result might be appealing because it seems
easy to implement.
17can be split into two parts, a uniform premium paid to (or a uniform fee charged
from) both ﬁrms in the ﬁrst period, and a premium paid to S-ﬁrms in the second
period. Indeed we establish in the next result that such a mechanism is feasible.
The regulator can choose a simple concave quadratic subsidy function, combined
with a uniform entry fee to be paid by the ﬁrms in the ﬁrst period and a premium
to be paid to those ﬁrms which stay in the second period.
Proposition 7 [Optimal policy without discrimination in the case of early exit]
If exit of some ﬁrms is optimal, the regulator can achieve the ﬁrst best allocation
by subsidizing output of both ﬁrms in the ﬁrst period through the quadratic concave
output subsidy function

















































































For the proof see the appendix.
Note that the concavity of the subsidy function guarantees that the ﬁrms’ second-
order conditions are satisﬁed. This also guarantees that exiting ﬁrms receive a higher
18marginal subsidy since E-ﬁrms are not interested in private learning. Note that in
total the entry tax plus the premium for staying can be positive or negative.
With the help of ﬁgure 1 one can easily see the diﬀerence between the two reg-
ulatory policies, the discriminatory linear scheme and the concave scheme. If the


















Figure 1: Comparison between the mechanism with an output subsidy function and the
constant output subsidy regime
regulator chooses the mechanism stated in proposition 7, both X-ﬁrms and S-ﬁrms
have to pay the entry tax Tent = A = 1
2(a¡S0
out)y¤
x. In the optimum X-ﬁrms receive
output subsidies of size A + B + C and S-ﬁrms those of size A + B + C + D + E
according to the marginal output function S0
out = a¡by. Thus X-ﬁrms receive total
subsidies of A + B + C ¡ Tent = B + C, whereas S-ﬁrms receive total subsidies of








If the regulator can commit himself to pay discriminating constant output subsidies
and an entry premium for the S-ﬁrms after the ﬁrst period, X-ﬁrms receive in the op-
timum total output subsidies of B+C = S0
outy¤
x whereas S-ﬁrms get output subsidies
of C+E = S0
outys¤







Of course, the eﬀective allocation resulting from the two regimes is the same. The
advantage of the mechanism with a concave output subsidy function is that the reg-
ulator does not need to know of which type a ﬁrm is. If the regulator introduced the
19constant subsidies and could not discriminate between the ﬁrms, S-ﬁrms would opt
for the higher output subsidies sx
out and produce too much in the ﬁrst period lead-
ing to a suboptimal allocation. Note that even with the concave subsidy function
scheme we have a commitment problem since S-ﬁrms must believe that the premium
for staying Pstay is paid in the second period.
It is obvious that situations exist where early exit of some ﬁrms is socially optimal.
Petrakis et al. (1997) have shown that this is possible for ² = 0. In subsection 3.2.3
we will show that this is also possible for ² = 1. It is not diﬃcult to ﬁnd parameters
for 0 < ² < 1, where early exit is socially optimal. For example, if we choose
Pt = 1000 ¡ Yt, C1(y1;i) = 2y2
1;i with i = x;s, and C2(y2;Ls) = (y2 ¡ 5=6Ls)2 + y2
2
and ² = 1=1000, early exit is optimal.
3.2.3 Complete Learning Spillovers
Here, we consider the special case where learning spillovers are complete. This
means, there are no private learning eﬀects. All experience gathered by any ﬁrm
immediately spills over to all other ﬁrms. In our model this boils down to ² = 1 which
immediately implies LS = LE. Hence, the S-ﬁrms have no cost advantage over the
E-ﬁrms and thus they are not able to make any proﬁts in the second period to cover
their losses of the ﬁrst one. Therefore, the ﬁrst period market price is determined
by pX = [C(yX) + F]=yX; the second period price by pE = [C2(yE;LE) + F]=yE:
Moreover all ﬁrms make zero proﬁt in each period. For the case of complete learning
spillovers we can state explicitly the conditions when late entry is optimal:









2 > 0 and ± suﬃciently small.
For the proof see the appendix.
The following example veriﬁes that both late entry and early exit are indeed
possible for complete learning spillovers both without regulation and in the social
20optimum.6
Example 4 Let ² = 1, Pt(Yt) = (100¡Yt)=¯ , C1(y1) = 20y2
1; C2(y2;L) = 20y2
2=(1+
L): and F = 10. Further let ¯ = 2:5 or ¯ = 3:3. Then we get the results of Table 3.
Table 3: Entry and exit of ﬁrms is possible, ² = 1
Laissez-faire Social Optimum
¯ = 2:5 ¯ = 3:3 ¯ = 3:3 ¯ = 7
Period 1 2 1 2 1 2 1 2
p 28.28 5.14 28.28 10.22 21.34 5.11 12.83 8.47
y 0.71 3.89 0.71 1.96 0.71 3.91 0.71 2.36
n 41.42 22.39 9.42 33.86 41.85 21.25 14.37 17.24
Y 29.29 87.15 6.66 66.27 29.59 83.12 10.16 40.74
We see that for ¯ = 2:5 (demand is relatively strong) and laissez-faire, some ﬁrms
leave the market after the ﬁrst period. By virtue of the relatively strong demand,
learning eﬀects are strong such that in the second period, both marginal costs and
prices are so low that only few ﬁrms with a high output can survive in the market.
Total output in the second period is also higher than in the ﬁrst one.
For ¯ = 3:3 demand is relatively weak such that the market can sustain only a
few ﬁrms that can learn. Nevertheless, learning leads to reduced variable costs and
the market is able to sustain more ﬁrms in the second period in case of laissez-faire.
Note that in the social optimum with ¯ = 3:3 there is early exit. Choosing ¯ = 7
we can also verify late entry in the social optimum.
Note that due to complete learning spillovers, incumbent ﬁrms do not have a cost
advantage over late entering ﬁrms. Hence, in contrast to the case ² < 1; it is now in
6Note that in the examples 4, 5, and 6 demand is always the same in the ﬁrst and the second














































Figure 2: Number of S-, X-, and E-ﬁrms for diﬀerent demand parameters
principle possible that some ﬁrms leave the market at the end of period 1 and new
ﬁrms enter lately at the same time.
3.2.4 Laissez-faire and Welfare Eﬀects through Blocking Entry
To conclude this section we show that also under laissez-faire both cases may arise:
Some ﬁrms may exit early without taking advantage of their stock of knowledge.
If parameters are diﬀerent some ﬁrms may decide to enter lately, exploiting the
experience of the pioneers. The following example veriﬁes this claim.
Example 5 [Late entry and early exit without regulation]





± = 1, and F = 10. If we increase the demand parameter ¯ from 2 to 3.9 we obtain
the graph in ﬁgure 2 which plots the equilibrium number of ﬁrms as a function of the
demand parameter ¯. Whereas for high demand (¯ small) we observe both X-ﬁrms
and S-ﬁrms, the number of X-ﬁrms decreases with increasing ¯. There is a small
22Table 4: Late entry and early exit of ﬁrms without regulation, ² = 0:5, ± = 1
¯ = 3:3 ¯ = 2
1. Period 2. Period 1. Period 2. Period
p 27.43 11.80 28.28 5.89
y, S-ﬁrms 0.73 1.80 0.72 4.40
y, X-ﬁrms 0 0 0.71 0
y, E-ﬁrms 0 1.69 0 0
n, S-ﬁrms 13.01 13.01 25.97 25.97
n, X-ﬁrms 0 0 35.05 0
n, E-ﬁrms 0 22.19 0 0
Y 9.49 61.06 43.43 88.22
Π, S-ﬁrms -0.634 +0.634 -0.002 +0.002
range for ¯ around 2.8 where there are only S-ﬁrms.7 For higher ¯ we have both
S-ﬁrms and E-ﬁrms in the market. In table 4 we provide the results for all variables
for ¯ = 3:3 and ¯ = 2.
Moreover, it is worth to mention that without a subsidy policy the market out-
come with late entry can be worse than without entry. If a regulator protects the
market by forbidding late entry, we may get the surprising result that prices may
be lower and total output can be higher compared to the scenario when entry is
allowed. This can be veriﬁed by means of the following example:
Example 6 [Increasing welfare through blocking entry]
Using the same demand and cost functions as in example 5 we obtain the results
shown in table 5. Comparing the ﬁrst and second period results of the two cases we
7This is diﬀerent to Baumols et al. (1982) result for two-product ﬁrms. They show that we
observe only for one particular parameter constellation an equilibrium with only two-product ﬁrms
in the market. For all other parameters we always observe both two-product and one-product
ﬁrms. There, the outcome which types of ﬁrms are in the market hinges only on total costs. The
reason for this diﬀerence are the learning spillovers in our model: Firm costs are also inﬂuenced
by demand because costs depend on the number of ﬁrms and the number of ﬁrms clearly depends
on demand.
23see that prices increase from 25.55 to 28.28 in the ﬁrst and from 7.54 to 10.22 in
the second period. Total output decreases from 15.69 to 6.66 in the ﬁrst period and
from 75.13 to 66.27 in the second period.
Table 5: ² = 1, ¯ = 3:3
Entry forbidden Entry allowed
1. Period 2. Period 1. Period 2. Period
p 25.55 7.54 28.28 10.22
y 0.66 3.14 0.71 1.96
n 23.90 23.90 22.39 33.86
Y 15.69 75.13 6.66 66.27
The intuition for example 6 is that without entry more of the beneﬁts of learning
can be reaped by the S-ﬁrms which invested in learning. Thus the incentive to learn
is higher. Under such circumstances and if subsidies are not feasible it can be a
second best policy for the regulator to regulate or even forbid late market entry.
3.3 Comparative Statics
To derive the marginal comparative static eﬀects in the case of late entry and early
exit resulting from a small increase of the subsidy or the entry premium, we have
to distinguish between the three possible cases with S-ﬁrms only, with S-ﬁrms and
X-ﬁrms, or with S-ﬁrms and E-ﬁrms. While for the ﬁrst case the results are the
same as in section 2.4,8 the results are diﬀerent for the two other cases.
Proposition 9 Consider a regime where the regulator pays an entry premium and
(uniform of diﬀerentiated) subsidies on output. Assume that in a competitive equi-
librium with entry premia and output subsidies there are X-ﬁrms and S-ﬁrms in the
market, i.e. some ﬁrms leave the market after the ﬁrst period.
8For the comparative statics result, the additional ﬁx costs in period 2 do not aﬀect the results.
24i) Then in both regimes (with uniform of diﬀerentiated subsidies on output), the
eﬀect of increasing the entry premium is as follows:
@Y1=@ss
ent = 0, @Y2=@ss
ent > 0, @p1=@ss
ent = 0, @p2=@ss
ent < 0,
@y1=@ss
ent < 0, @y2=@ss
ent < 0, @ns=@ss
ent > 0, @yx=@ss
ent = 0,
ii) If the regulator can discriminate between exiting and staying ﬁrms, then the
eﬀects of increasing the output subsidy for staying ﬁrms, denoted by ss
out, yields
@Y1=@ss
out = 0, @p1=@ss
out = 0,




out > 0, @p1=@sx
out < 0.
iv) If the regulator pays a uniform subsidy s
s;x
out for S-ﬁrms and X-ﬁrms, then an
increase of the subsidy yields:
@Y1=@s
s;x
out > 0, @Y2=@s
s;x
out > 0, @p1=@s
s;x
out < 0, @p2=@s
s;x
out < 0.
Compared to the comparative static results without early exit or late entry, we get
clear eﬀects for more variables. An increase of the entry subsidy for S-ﬁrms (be
it output subsidies for both ﬁrms or an entry subsidy for the S-ﬁrms) increases
total output and thus lowers the price in both periods for sure. While the entry
subsidy leaves the output of X-ﬁrms unaﬀected, the output of each S-ﬁrm decreases
in both periods while the number of ﬁrms increases. For the output subsidies we get
unambigous results for less variables. The uniform subsidy increases total output in
both periods while prices decrease. For the diﬀerent output subsidies we see that
ﬁrst period output does not decrease, and the price does not increase.
Proposition 10 Consider a regime where the regulator pays an entry premium for
S-ﬁrms and subsidies on ﬁrst period output. Assume that in a competitive equilib-
rium with entry premium and output subsidy there are E-ﬁrms and S-ﬁrms in the
market, i.e. some ﬁrms enter the market after the ﬁrst period. Then the eﬀects of
an increase of the entry subsidy sent for S-ﬁrms are as follows:
25@Y1=@sent > 0, @y1=@sent < 0, @ns=@sent > 0, @p1=@sent < 0,
@Y2=@sent > 0, @p2=@sent < 0
An entry subsidy for S-ﬁrms increases total output and decreases prices in both
periods. The number of S-ﬁrms increases while the ﬁrst period output decreases.
Unfortunately, the eﬀects resulting from an increase of an output subsidy on ﬁrst
period output are ambigous.
The proofs for propositions 9 and 10 are very similar to the proofs of propositions
2 and 3 in subsection 2.4 and can be obtained by the authors on request.
4 Conclusions
In this paper we have shown that in a model with competitive ﬁrms, free entry
and learning spillovers, unlike the case of purely private learning-by-doing eﬀects,
eﬃcient allocations do not emerge through a laissez-faire regime. By virtue of the
positive externalities, this does not seem to be surprizing per se. It is surprising, how-
ever, that the regulator needs (at least) two instruments to internalize the spillover
eﬀects. The reason is that under laissez-faire there is both too little production and
too little market entry. If market entry is once and for all, we have shown that the
learning spillovers require both a subsidy on output and a premium for starting a
business.
If early exit and late entry are possible, matters are more complicated. First
of all, both cases can occur: It can be optimal that more ﬁrms enter lately and
take advantage of the experience made by the pioneers. By contrast, it can also be
optimal that some ﬁrms leave the market and do not harvest the fruit from learning,
but nevertheless let the staying ﬁrms beneﬁt from their experience. In the ﬁrst case,
where late entry is optimal, the optimal policy scheme is basically the same as for
the case where there is entry once and for all and no exit. If exit is optimal for a
certain number of ﬁrms, the regulatory scheme is more complicated. The regulator
needs to employ a concave subsidy scheme, combined with an entry fee for the ﬁrst
26period, and a premium for staying in the second period.
Since the policy scheme is quite diﬀerent for the two cases, it is diﬃcult to pro-
pose a clear general policy recommendation. For the regulator the informational
requirement is quite high in order to implement an optimal policy scheme. Never-
theless, we think that our results are important to give more insight in the kind of
externalities arising from learning spillovers. Even without imperfect competition
which was the main focus of the previous literature in the presence of learning and
learning spillovers markets with free entry lead to complex market imperfections and
thus would in principle require complex regulation schemes. Hence, we see necessity
for further research into two directions, one theoretical, and one empirical. From a
theoretical point of view it would be interesting to know how the regualtory schemes
developed in this paper can be extended for cases of imperfect information on the
size of the learning eﬀects, the spillovers, and the elasticity of market demand. The
question is whether, similarly to Rauch’s (1992) contribution, there is at least a
robust rule of thumb for a second best optimal scheme of subsidies and entry pre-
mia. The second branch of research is empirical. We need to know more about the
quantity of learning eﬀects and learning spillovers. Of course, this is diﬃcult too
since learning eﬀects are largest for new products and new production processes for
which we usually do not have suﬃcient data.
Even though it is diﬃcult to determine optimal regulation schemes, we think that
our results shed some new light on the discussion and criticism on start-up premia
and subsidies for new industries. Those may even be optimal if market conditions
are seemingly perfect, i.e. markets are competitive and no entry barriers (apart from
a lack of experience) exist.
27A Appendix
Stability Conditions:
In the following we write for short: P 0
1 = P 0(ny1) and P 0
2 = P 0(ny2). Totally





















































































For stability M must be negative deﬁnite. This requires that the three principal
minors satisfy the following conditions: M1 < 0, M2 > 0, M3 < 0. Note that
M1 < 0 and M2 > 0 follows directly from our assumptions. M3 follows from our
assumption on stability of equilibrium.
Proof of proposition 2:
Solving (28) for @y1=@sent, @y2=@sent, and @n=@sent; and for the eﬀect on total
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If condition (10) is satisﬁed, we obtain @y1=@sent < 0, @y2=@sent < 0, and
@n=@sent > 0. If condition (11) is satisﬁed, @Y1=@sent > 0 holds. A is positive
for all ² if condition (12) is satisﬁed. Then @Y2=@sent > 0.
Proof of proposition 3:
Next solving (27) for @y1=@sout, @y2=@sout, @n=@sout; @Y1=@sout, and @Y2=@sout








































































































































































If ² is small and B satisﬁes condition (12) the numerator is negative and @y1=@sout >
0. With increasing ² it is possible that @y1=@sout < 0, because all other terms of
the numerator are positive if condition (14) holds. If conditions (14) and (10) hold,
all terms of the numerator of @y2=@sout are positive and therfore @y1=@sout < 0. If
condition (14) is satisﬁed all terms of the numerator of @n=@sout are negative and
@n=@sout > 0. C is positive for all " if condition (12) is satisﬁed and overall convexity
holds. If additionally condition (13) holds, we obtain @Y1=@sout > 0. Finally, with
conditons (12) and (13) satisﬁed @Y2=@sout > 0.
30Proof of proposition 5:
i. has already been proved.
ii. Assume that late entry is optimal. Then the f.o.c. for the social optimum with
respect to ys














L(ye;Le)] = 0 (29)

























2;Ls) ¡ F] = 0
Both, the ﬁrst order conditions with respect to output in the second period,
ys
2 and ye; and with respect to the number of lately entering ﬁrms, ne, are
straightforward and can be omitted since they do not contain terms which
create externalities. In the decentralized economy, the zero proﬁt condition
and the ﬁrst order condition of a staying ﬁrm which is subject to both an entry
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2;Ls) = 0 (32)
Comparing these two equations to (31) and (29) we obtain (16) and (17).
The late entering ﬁrms do not cause any externality. Hence no regulation is
necessary.
Proof of proposition 6: Assume that exit is optimal. By Proposition 5 i) ne
is zero in (15). The ﬁrst order conditions for the social optimum with respect to ns
(the staying ﬁrms) and nx (the exiting ﬁrms) and output are given in proposition
7. The ﬁrst order condition with respect to ys
2 can be omitted. In the decentralized
economy with an entry premium for the S-ﬁrms and output subsidies ss
out and sx
out
31the zero proﬁt conditions and the ﬁrst order conditions with respect to output in
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P1(yx)yx ¡ C
1(yx) ¡ F + s
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out = 0 (36)
where ss
out is given by (19), ss
ent by (20), and sx
out by (18). Substituting those ex-
pressions into (33) - (36), rearranging, and noting that the equilibrium is unique,
we obtain the ﬁrst order conditions for the socially optimal allocation (37) - (40).
Proof of proposition 7: Assume that exit is optimal. By Proposition 5 a) ne
is zero in (15). Diﬀerentiating (15), the ﬁrst order conditions for social optimum
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2;Ls) = 0 (40)
The ﬁrst order condition with respect to yS
2 can be omitted. In the decentralized
economy with entry premia a non-linear output subsidy function sout(y1) in the
ﬁrst period, the zero proﬁt conditions and the ﬁrst order conditions with respect to
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1(yx) ¡ Tent ¡ F = 0 (42)
P1(y
s










2;Ls) = 0 (43)
P1(yx) + a ¡ byx ¡ C
1
yx(yx) = 0 (44)
32where a is given by (21), b by (22), Tent by (23), and Pstay by (24). Substituting
those expressions into (41) - (44), rearranging, and noting that the equilibrium is
unique, we obtain the ﬁrst order conditions for the socially optimal allocation (37)
- (40). Since the subsidy function Sout(y1) is concave, the second order conditions
of the ﬁrms are satisﬁed.
Proof of proposition 8: Without loss of generality let us deﬁne ˜ Li = °Li
with i = e;s and ° ¸ 0. ° is a parameter reﬂecting the strength of total learning
(private or public). If ° = 0 there is no learning at all. If ² = 1, i.e. spillovers are
complete, we have Le = Ls. Thus late entry ﬁrms face the same costs as S-ﬁrms.
The social planner does not need to distinguish between the two types of ﬁrms. The
same holds for the ﬁrst period: With complete learning spillovers there is no real
diﬀerence between X-ﬁrms and S-ﬁrms. Therefore, we only need to look at the total
number of ﬁrms, n1 and n2, in either periods . If n1 < n2 there is late entry and
vice versa. First suppose that ± = 0 and that ° = 0, i.e. the regulator is extremely
myopic and there is no learning (public or private) at all. Then it is obvious that
n1 = n2 if demand is the same in both periods. The comparative static result for





























2 > 0 holds, the number of ﬁrms increases with
increasing total learning, i.e. we have late entry. The comparative static result for
an increase of ± shows that n1 is increasing and n2 can go in either direction. But as
the functions are continuous we can be sure that for ± suﬃciently small we observe
more ﬁrms in the second period.
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